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From Farm to Table: How This Little
Piggy Was Dragged Through the Market
By JUSTINE HINDERLITER*
ON DECEMBER 9, 2003, a Holstein cow raised in Alberta, Canada
arrived at Vern's Moses Lake Meats ("Vern's") in Washington for
slaughter.' Unbeknownst to the slaughtering plant employees, and
the rest of America, the cow was infected with Bovine Spongiform En-
cephalopathy ("BSE"), more commonly known as "Mad Cow Dis-
ease."2 Even more troubling is how Vern's discovered the infected
animal. According to Dave Louthan, Vern's then-slaughterer, the cow
was not caught by routine inspection, "but by 'a fluke."' 3 Louthan as-
serts that the cow he killed was not a "downer" cow, 4 although the
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1. Jason R. Odeshoo, No Brainer? The USDA's Regulatory Response to the Discovery of
"Mad Cow" Disease in the United States, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 277, 297 (2005); see also
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Official Tells of Investigation into Mad Cow Discrepancies, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2004, at A16 [hereinafter Official Tells]; Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Feed in Mad Cow
Investigation Is Traced to 2 Mills in Canada, N.Y. TIMES (AP), Mar. 20, 2004, at Al [hereinaf-
ter Feed in Mad Cow]. The cow had been fed contaminated feed containing meat and bone
meal of infected animals. See McNeil, Feed in Mad Cow, supra, at Al. In 1997, the Food and
Drug Administration imposed a "ban on feeding rendered cattle meat or beef byproducts
to cattle." Eric Schlosser, The Cow Jumped over the U.S.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2004, at A17.
2. See Sandra Blakeslee, Plan for Sharp Rise in Mad Cow Testing Gets Mixed Reaction, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004, at A19 [hereinafter Blakeslee, Plan].
3. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Man Who Killed the Mad Cow Has Questions of His Own, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at F2 [hereinafter Man Who Killed].
4. A downer cow is one that is either too sick or injured to walk. See Official Tells,
supra note 1, at A16. The USDA uses the term "non-ambulatory" to designate cows that are
unable to walk. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA Announces BSE Test Results
and New BSE Confirmatory Testing Protocol, Release No. 0232.05 (June 24, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0.A/7_0-lOB?contentidonly=True&
contentid=2005/06/0232.xml [hereinafter June 24 Press Release]; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
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United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA" or "Agency") re-
ported otherwise.5 After the animal was killed, it was subjected to vis-
ual post-mortem inspection 6 and a sample of its brain tissue was sent
to a laboratory for further testing.7 In the meantime, the cow went to
slaughter-its carcass amounted to 600 pounds of infected meat, and
was mixed with untainted meat from nineteen other cows, totaling
five tons8 of tainted meat.9 It was not until December 23, 2003, when
the brain sample tested positive for BSE, 10 that the USDA imple-
mented a "voluntary recall of meat that might have been tainted.""i
The USDA targeted 38,000 pounds of tainted meat, but only recov-
ered 21,000 pounds. 12 By the time the USDA initiated the voluntary
AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., FSIS NOTICE 5-04, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR NON-
AMBULATORY DISABLED CATTLE AND AGE DETERMINATION (2004), available at http://www.
fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISNotices/5-04.pdf. In fact, Mr. Louthan and two other wit-
nesses attest that the cow was walking when it was killed. See Official Tells, supra note 1, at
A16.
5. Man Who Killed, supra note 3, at F2. "The official records of the veterinarian at the
slaughterhouse . . . said the animal was . . . down on its sternum, or chest, before it was
killed." Official Tells, supra note 1. The distinction between downer and walking cows is
significant because, shordy after the infected cow was discovered, the USDA announced a
plan to increase testing for Mad Cow Disease. See Marc Kaufman, USDA Accused of Mislead-
ing Public on Mad Cow, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2004, at Al, A6. The plan, critics argue, falsely
focused on testing downer cows because the Agency claimed that downer cows are more
likely to have BSE. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Release No. 0105.04, Veneman
Announces Expanded BSE Surveillance Program (Mar. 15, 2004). The Agency hailed the
increased testing on downer cows as the most effective strategy because downer cows are
"at higher risk of having mad cow disease." See Blakesee, supra note 2, at 19. Although the
USDA claimed the plan should "reassure consumers, trading partners and the industry
that cows were being properly tested," the Agency also ignored the fact that the infected
cow was not a downer cow. Id. In fact, the USDA Inspector General said the "testing pro-
gram was poorly designed, falsely assumed only high-risk animals could be infected, and
inappropriately relied on voluntary submissions for testing." Carey Gillam, Furor Grows over
Lax US Mad Cow Testing, RENSE.COM, Aug. 2, 2004, http://www.rense.com/general56/loo.
htm.
6. See Man Who Killed, supra note 3, at F2 (describing Mr. Louthan's ante-mortem
observations of the infected cow); Odeshoo, supra note 1, at 297.
7. See Odeshoo, supra note 1, at 297.
8. One ton is approximately 2000 pounds.
9. SeeJon Ortiz, State Wants to Revisit Beef-Recall Secrecy Pact, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 18,
2004, at Al, A10 [hereinafter Ortiz, Beef-Recall Secrecy Pact]. More troubling still is the fact
that the cow had arrived in the United States in a herd. It is likely that these other cows,
over 255, ate the same infected feed. The USDA began a "traceback investigation," and on
February 9, 2004, it concluded the investigation having found only twenty-eight cows. See
Odeshoo, supra note 1, at 298-99.
10. See Ortiz, Beef-Recall Secrecy Pact, supra note 9, at AIO.
11. See id.
12. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Food Safety & Inspection Serv., FSIS Up-
date of Recall Activities (Feb. 9, 2004), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/recalls/prelease/up-
date067-2003.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
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recall, the tainted meat had already been shipped to over forty busi-
nesses in eight states and Guam.13 The USDA's slow response left
many-politicians and citizens alike-wondering how safe the Ameri-
can meat supply is and what the USDA could do to improve its
regulation.14
This Comment argues that although the USDA is mandated to
protect the United States' meat supply,' 5 its complex and ineffective
regulations compromise meat safety instead of ensuring it, especially
in the face of the BSE threat. Further, the USDA and its antiquated
laws and overreaching protocols prevent the market from correcting
many of the current problems in the meat industry. As opposed to
guiding and supporting the meat market, the USDA's protocols
render it inefficient. As a result, retailers cannot mitigate against the
BSE threat, producers are required to produce under the USDA's
poor quality standards, and consumers are forced to make unin-
formed purchasing decisions.
Although a complete overhaul of USDA authority and protocols
would ideally restore faith and safety to the meat industry, large-scale
reorganization is unlikely to happen. Therefore, this Comment pro-
poses that in order for the USDA to ensure a safe meat supply, it must
incorporate containment mechanisms in addition to its preventative
mechanisms into its regulatory scheme. Specifically, this Comment as-
serts that the USDA must have mandatory recall authority to effec-
tively contain potential outbreaks within the United States. Part I of
this Comment outlines the two main meat regulation statutes and cur-
rent inspection practices in the United States. Part II discusses how
the USDA is ill-equipped to protect against Mad Cow Disease. Part III
describes how the USDA's protocols create market inefficiencies that
harm producers, retailers, and consumers. Part V explains how the
13. Odeshoo, supra note 1, at 298. States that were affected by the recall: "Washing-
ton, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FOOD SAFETY, USDA AND FDA NEED TO BETTER ENSURE PROMPT AND COMPLETE RECALLS OF
POTENTIALLY UNSAFE FOOD 41 (2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
14. See Jon Ortiz, State Hit a Wall on Beef Recall: Incomplete--or No-Responses from the
USDA Put Officials in a Bind, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 10, 2004, at DI, D3 [hereinafter State
Hit a Wall ].
15. See Blake B. Johnson, The Supreme Beef Case: An Opportunity to Rethink Federal Food
Safety Regulation, 16 Lov. CONSUMER L. REv. 159, 161 (2003). In 1862, the USDA was estab-
lished to promote American agriculture, and the charter did not include any provisions
regarding food safety. Id. It was not until the 1890s, after European countries opposed
America's lack of food safety standards that Congress gave the USDA power to inspect
meat. See Hana Simon, Food Safety Enforcement Enhancement Act of 1997: Putting Public Health
Before the Meat Industry's Bottom Line, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 679, 683 (1998) [hereinafter Food
Safety].
Spring 2006] USDA REGULATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
USDA prevents the meat market from correcting its inefficiencies. Fi-
nally, Part V maintains that the USDA must have mandatory recall
authority, which it currently lacks, to ensure a safe American meat
supply.
I. The Current USDA Regulation Protocols Do Not
Effectively Regulate Meat and Cannot Ensure a Safe
American Meat Supply
Several federal agencies, including the USDA, share responsibil-
ity for food quality and health standards.1 6 Each agency operates inde-
pendently and has numerous enforcement departments, giving the
impression that the American meat supply is one of the safest in the
world. This notion, however, is far from the truth. On the contrary,
this multi-jurisdictional approach often complicates and hinders effec-
tive regulation.1 7 To wit, the Food Safety Office of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention estimates that "76 million people get
sick, more than 300,000 are hospitalized, and 5000 Americans die
each year from food-borne illness. 18 The most common causes of
food-borne infections are bacterial pathogens, which are most fre-
quently found in meat and poultry. 19 Not only does this fragmented
structure jeopardize a safe meat supply, but the USDA, as the primary
agency that regulates the meat industry,20 also operates under cen-
tury-old laws-the Federal Meat Inspection Act (1906)21 and the Virus
Serum Toxin Act (1913) 22-a fact which in and of itself lends to the
USDA's inability to keep up with the changing times. As such, the
16. Other agencies include: the Federal Drug Administration, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, the Department of Treasury's Customs Service, the Cooperative State Re-
search, Education, and Extension Service, the Agricultural Marketing Service, the
Economic Research Service, the Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyard Administration,
the United States Codex Office, the Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries
Service, as well as independent state agencies. See Lisa Lovett, Food for Thought: Consistent
Protocol Could Strengthen Food Supply Security Measures, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 465, 468-69
(2004).
17. See Michael R. Taylor, Preparing America's Food Safety System for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury-Who Is Responsible for What When It Comes to Meeting the Food Safety Challenges of the
Consumer-Driven Global Economy?, 52 FooD & DRUG L.J. 13, 18 (1997).
18. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Food Safety Office, http://www.cdc.gov/
foodsafety (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
19. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Division of Bacterial & Mycotic Diseases,
Food-borne Illness, General Information, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/disease
info/food-borneinfections-g.htm#mostcommon (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2000).
22. 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159.
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USDA and its antiquated and inadequate regulations actually prevent
the market from operating efficiently.
A. The History of the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the
Creation of the USDA
In the 1890s Congress delegated to the USDA the responsibility
of ante and post-mortem inspection of all livestock slaughtered for
United States distribution and consumption. 23 It was not until 1906,
and after intense public pressure, 24 that Congress passed the first leg-
islation focused on meat inspection.25 The Federal Meat Inspection
Act 26 ("Federal Meat Act") established sanitary standards for cattle
carcasses and gave the USDA the authority to inspect as it saw fit.27 In
the same year, Congress also passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act 28
("PFDA"), which made it a crime to introduce adulterated 29 food into
the stream of commerce.3 0
Although Congress has amended the Federal Meat Act several
times to increase USDA responsibilities,3 1 Congress has never indi-
cated how the USDA is to enforce meat inspection and safety. Instead
of explicit instructions, Congress relies on the USDA to create inspec-
tion protocol.3 2 As such, the USDA has two units3 3 primarily responsi-
23. SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 161.
24. Upton Sinclair's THE JUNGLE, which exposed the horrific and unsanitary condi-
tions in the Chicago meat-packing industry, sparked public outcry. For background on THE
JUNGLE and its social and political implications, see generally JAMES HARvEy YOUNG, PURE
FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS Acn OF 1906 (1989).
25. See Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA's Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142, 143 (1998).
26. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695.
27. 21 U.S.C. § 603(a). For an example of the USDA exercising its vast power, see
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) Systems, 60
Fed. Reg. 6774, 6777 (Feb. 3, 1995) (codified at 9 C.F.R. 308, 310, 318, 320, 325-27, 381).
[hereinafter Pathogen Reduction].
28. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
392(a))).
29. Any meat product that does not meet USDA approval during inspection is consid-
ered adulterated. See Pathogen Reduction, supra note 27, at 6780.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 392(a).
31. For example, in 1967, Congress passed the Wholesome Meat Act, which amended
the Federal Meat Act to give USDA control over more aspects of the meat industry. Pub. L.
No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 585 (1967) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 71-91).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 603(a).
33. The USDA has over half a dozen different USDA branches involved in food safety.
See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Agencies and Offices, http://www.usda.gov/ (follow "Agencies &
Offices" hyperlink). Arguably, the Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administra-
tion ("GIPSA") plays a role in ensuring safe meat as well. GIPSA is responsible for inspect-
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ble for ensuring a safe American meat supply: the Food Safety
Inspection Service 34 and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Ser-
vice.3 5 As discussed in the following sections, both of these branches
are separated by statutory boundaries within overlapping areas of re-
sponsibility. Consequently, the USDA's bureaucratic landscape fur-
ther complicates the USDA's ineffective protocols.3 6
1. Food Safety Inspection Service
The Food Safety Inspection Service ("Food Inspection Service") is
the enforcement branch of the USDA responsible for meat inspec-
tion. 37 "Federal law requires the Food Inspection Service to physically
inspect each animal slaughtered in a meat packing plant.13 8 As such,
the Food Inspection Service is in charge of continual inspection of
each and every plant in the United States that processes meat or food
containing meat products.3 9
Considering the number of processing plants, consumer de-
mand, the competitive environment surrounding the meat industry,
and the risk to public health involved, the USDA inspection mandate
puts a hefty burden on the Food Inspection Service. Yet, changes and
innovation in meat inspection are rare. Tests established in 1906 were
mainly organoleptic (sight, smell, touch) tests, 40 which are ineffective
in detecting food-borne pathogens, such as E. coli41 and BSE. How-
ever, the "poke and sniff method"42 remained virtually unchanged un-
til the mid-1990s after a severe outbreak of E. coli in 1993, where over
seven hundred people got sick after eating undercooked hamburgers
ing grains for safety and quality. See 7 C.F.R. 2.81 (2004). Because BSE became an epidemic
when infected cattle remains were used as feed for other cattle, it is clear that what cows eat
directly affects their health and impacts the quality of the meat that humans consume. See
infra Part II.
34. 7 C.F.R. 2.53.
35. 7 C.F.R. 2.80.
36. See infra Parts I.A.1, I.B.
37. 7 C.F.R. § 2.53.
38. SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 162-63.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 604 (2000); 7 C.F.R. § 2.53 (describing various Food Inspection Ser-
vice responsibilities).
40. See Press Release, Pub. Citizen, New Federal Meat Inspection System Fails to Earn
Inspectors' Seal of Approval (Sept. 5, 2000), available at http://www.citizen.org/press
room/release.cfm?ID=768 (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
41. See Casey, supra note 25, at 148.
42. See Kerri E. Machado, "Unfit for Human Consumption": Why American Beef Is Making
Us Sick, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 801, 816 (2003). There was a reported sixty-five outbreaks
of E. coli from 1980-1990, an astronomical and unacceptable amount for American con-
sumers. See GAIL A. EISNITZ, SLAUGHTERHOUSE: THE SHOCKING STORY OF GREED, NEGLECT,
AND INHUMANE TREATMENT INSIDE THE U.S. MEAT INDUSTRY 158 (1997).
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from a fast food restaurant. 43 As a result, the Food Inspection Service
initiated an inspection program to alleviate inspection stresses. From
1998 to 2000, the Food Inspection Service phased in the Hazard Anal-
ysis and Critical Control Point ("HACCP") system, which is the meat
industry's current and directed inspection program. 4 4 Although the
HACCP system appeared to be a step in the right direction, 45 it fails
when faced with the BSE threat.
2. The Current Food Inspection Service Meat Inspection Methods
The HACCP system is an inspection system that meat processing
plants incorporate in their production lines. 46 It focuses on prevent-
ing outbreaks by testing for microbial pathogens at the processing
level.4 7 Established in 1996,48 the HACCP system shifted inspection
duties to industry producers, while Food Inspection Service inspectors
became the overseers.4 9 It also instituted the first set of regulations
incorporating science into meat inspection 5 0-a bonafide step away
from the 1906 inspection methods.
The HACCP plan identifies the potential hazards in the pro-
cess.., and specifies process controls... that have been validated
as effective in preventing or minimizing the hazards. The HACCP
plan also establishes recordkeeping and monitoring procedures
that enable the operator to verify on a continuing basis that the
controls are working and to detect and promptly correct process-
ing errors.5 1
Essentially, plant employees "identify the major points of poten-
tial contamination in their production process as a means of prevent-
ing contamination." 52 The plant then tests products at these identified
points to determine if meat is within the contamination regulations.53
43. See Casey, supra note 25, at 148; see also EISNiTz supra note 42, at 159. In this E. coli
outbreak, three children died, and others affected by the infected meat were "sick enough
to need medical help," including hospitalization. Id.
44. SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 160.
45. The HACCP instituted the first set of regulations incorporating science into meat
inspection. See Machado, supra note 42, at 820.
46. See Pathogen Reduction, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Sys-
tems, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806-38,989 (July 25, 1996).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Taylor, supra note 17, at 21.
50. See Machado, supra note 42, at 820.
51. Taylor, supra note 17, at 20.
52. See Machado, supra note 42, at 820.
53. See EISNITZ, supra note 42, at 284-85. To be sure, the HACCP system does not
identify contamination problems and then eliminate them. Rather, it merely determines if
the product meets USDA standards. See id.
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Although the HACCP was hailed as the first regulatory effort to in-
clude microbial testing in the meat inspection process, and, as a re-
sult, a vast improvement from the poke and sniff method, the USDA
mistakenly relies on the system to catch all potential problems. The
HACCP has quality controls for some food-borne pathogens, such as
salmonella and E. coli,5 4 but the system does not detect BSE. 55 In ad-
dition, under current regulations, plants are not required to obtain
USDA approval for their processes, equipment, or facilities, nor are
USDA inspectors required to perform pre-slaughter sanitation
checks. 56 Instead, Food Inspection Service inspectors simply verify
that the producer-designed program meets meat safety standards.57 In
effect, Food Inspection Service inspectors no longer perform the ac-
tual inspections, but rather "check plant documentation."5 8 Rather
than double checking the products, Food Inspection Service inspec-
tors merely rely on the plant's production records to determine
whether the plant's sanitation methods meet USDA standards. 59
Given that the HACCP does not detect BSE and the Food Inspection
Service inspectors do not double check products meant for human
consumption, the USDA's reliance on the HACCP system is a gross
mistake that endangers American consumers.
3. Additional Food Inspection Service Responsibility: Labeling
In addition to setting regulation standards for meat inspection,
the Federal Meat Act also governs meat and meat product labeling.
The USDA regulates branding and labeling of meat and meat prod-
ucts "to avoid inconsistency in . . . standards."60 The Food Inspection
Service is solely responsible for pre-market approval of the formulas
and labeling of most meat products.61 While the Federal Meat Act es-
tablished sanitary standards and mandated meat inspection of all car-
casses, it also required the Food Inspection Service to approve
product labels to ensure that labels reflect the USDA quality stan-
54. SeeJerry Adler, Mad Cow: What's Safe Now?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 2004, at 43, 45.
55. See infra Part III.A.
56. See Machado, supra note 42, at 822.
57. Taylor, supra note 17, at 21.
58. See Machado, supra note 42, at 822.
59. Casey, supra note 25, at 142.
60. 21 U.S.C. § 607(c) (2000).
61. See Richard A. Merrill &Jeffrey K Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation,
31 SETON HALL L. REv. 61, 101 (2000). However, the Food and Drug Administration regu-
lates game species meat. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 453(e), 6010); 9 C.F.R. §§ 301.2(qq), (rr),
381.1(b)(40) (1996).
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dards. 62 "[0] ne purpose of the [Federal Meat Act is] to empower the
[USDA] to adopt definitions and standards of identity or composition
so that the 'integrity' of meat food products could be 'effectively
maintained.' 63 Essentially, the Federal Meat Act sets quality standards
and requires that labels state only those standards. For example, after
meat is shipped to a store, the store cannot add or subtract any infor-
mation supplied to them by the USDA. This mandatory information
typically includes USDA cut and grade, weight, and expiration date. A
store is prohibited from indicating where the meat came from or
which slaughtering plant processed the meat. Labels cannot indicate
any divergence from the USDA standards-regardless of whether the
product falls short of USDA quality standards or exceeds them.64 The
danger with this kind of regulation is that since the current USDA
inspection protocols do not test for BSE, no information regarding
BSE contamination is included in the USDA mandatory product infor-
mation. As discussed further in Part IV, this regulation effectively pre-
vents market players, such as producers and retailers, from passing on
vital information to consumers.
B. The Virus Serum Toxin Act of 191365 and the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") is an-
other branch of the USDA and is responsible for keeping animals and
plants healthy. 66 Generally, APHIS protects against plant and animal
pests and diseases. 6 7 The Virus-Serum-Toxin Act of 191368 ("Virus
Act") delegates to APHIS sweeping powers-including sole review and
approval authority of diagnostic testing and the techniques used to
62. 21 U.S.C. § 607.
63. Armour Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1972).
64. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (stating that marking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient require-
ments in addition to, or different than, those made under this Act may not be imposed);
see also United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550 (8th Cir. 1998).
65. 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159. Another example of government reacting to market
conditions is the recent enactment of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 201). This recent legislation was passed in response to the events of 9/11. Title III
specifically targets the food supply and aims to protect the "safety and security of the food
and drug supply." Id. §§ 301-336. Although on its face this legislation appears to tackle
many concerns Americans had of further-primarily biological-attacks, it has been
argued that it is merely another empty law aimed to appease the public as opposed to
protect it. See Lovett, supra note 16, at 476-87.
66. See Adler, supra note 54, at 48.
67. Lovett, supra note 16, at 468.
68. 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (delegating powers to APHIS).
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treat animal diseases.69 The importance of the Virus Act in terms of
Mad Cow Disease is that it prohibits the production, marketing, and
use of diagnostic tests "use[d] in the treatment of domestic animals,
unless and until the said [diagnostic test] shall have been prepared,
under and in compliance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of Agriculture. '' 70 Essentially, no diagnostic test may be used without a
license from APHIS and failure to obtain a license would violate the
Virus Act.71 Unfortunately, APHIS has only licensed the BSE test kits
to itself.72 As such, only USDA scientists may lawfully test cows to de-
termine if they have BSE.73
Considering the shift of the Food Inspection Service inspection
duties to plant employees, the reason for prohibiting plants from us-
ing additional testing methods to ensure that its product is BSE-free
seems at odds with Congress's general deference to USDA-developed
regulations. Instead of permitting the meat industry to determine ap-
propriate and effective quality control mechanisms, as it does under
the Federal Meat Act, the Virus Act sanctions anyone-even states74
and private plants-who administer tests without a federal license. 75
Therefore, as discussed further in Part IV, although slaughtering
plants must create their own quality control processes, they are pro-
hibited from developing a system that will detect BSE within their
products.
69. Id.
70. 21 U.S.C. § 151.
71. See 21 U.S.C. § 159.
72. See Stephanie Simon, U.S., Some Ranchers Clash over Mad Cow Tests: The USDA Rejects
the Need to Certify All Cattle, a Policy that Blocks Some Beef Exports, L.A. TiMES, May 24, 2004, at
Al [hereinafter Some Ranchers Clash].
73. Eric Schlosser, Order the Fish, VAyirY FAIR, Nov. 2004, at 240, 245 [hereinafter
Schlosser, Fish]; see also Some Ranchers Clash, supra note 72, at Al, All.
74. Initially, the 1913 Act was interpreted to apply only to "interstate" commerce. See
Grand Labs., Inc. v. Harris, 644 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1981); Animal Health Inst. v. United
States Dep't of Agric., 487 F. Supp. 376 (D. Colo. 1980). Under these rulings, the 1913 Act
did not apply to licensing solely within an individual state. In response, Congress amended
it in 1985 to place regulation and licensing of all products and activities both interstate and
intrastate within the domain of federal law. See Food Securities Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
198, 99 Stat. 1657, tit. XVII, § 1768(e) (codifed at 7 U.S.C. § 136(y)).
75. 21 U.S.C. § 152. Violators could face a $1000 fine, up to a year in jail, or both per
incident. Id. § 158.
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II. The USDA's Inertia Makes It Ill-Equipped to Protect
Against the Unique and Contemporary Threat of
Mad Cow Disease
The first case of Mad Cow Disease was diagnosed in the United
Kingdom in 1986.76 "BSE is part of a closely related family of brain
wasting diseases called Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies
("TSEs") ,77 which affect a number of species. TSEs create holes in
the brain where brain cells have died and are slow, degenerative, and
one hundred percent fatal diseases.78
In 1982, Nobel Prize winning scientist Dr. Stanley Prusiner 79 de-
veloped the "prion theory," which explains that TSEs "[consist] only
of a protein which [he] termed the prion."80 The difference between
normal proteins and prions is the shape of the molecules. 8 1 Prions are
folded, which makes them resistant to heat, digestion, radiation, and
chemicals, 8 2 and, more importantly, prions "force normal protein
molecules to conform to [their] shape .... [It is] the accumulation of
prions [that] destroys the brain."83
The sudden European outbreak of BSE in the 1980s and 1990s
resulted from slight changes to the "rendering process, '84 which ena-
76. See Australian Acad. of Sci., Mad Cow Disease-A Human Problem?,
www.science.org.au/nova/003/003key.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
77. Susanne Aberbach-Marolda, The Law and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies:
The Case for Precautionary Measures, 15 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 4 (2003). A common form of
TSE, a disease called Scrapie, is found in sheep and has been prevalent for over 100 years.
Id. at 5-6; see also World Health Org., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, http://www.
who.int/zoonoses/diseases/bse/en/.
78. See Australian Acad. of Sci., supra note 76. As a result, the animal loses control over
movement and suffers from behavior changes, rendering it "mad." The clinical name re-
flects the topography of the brain once the disease takes over-essentially, the brain looks
like a sponge. See id.
79. Stanley B. Prusiner, Detecting Mad Cow Disease, Sci. AM., July 2004, at 86, 91 ("Stan-
ley B. Prusiner is professor of neurology and biochemistry at the University of California
San Francisco School of Medicine .... In 1997 he won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or
Medicine for his discovery and research into prions.").
80. Id. at 86.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See Nat'l Consumers League, Mad Cow Disease Basics, NCL BULL., Jan./Feb. 2004,
at 11 [hereinafter NCL BULLETIN].
84. See Aberbach-Marolda, supra note 77, at 7-8. The rendering process is a process
during which protein matter from carcasses of slaughtered animals is isolated. Id. During
the rendering process carcasses are thrown into boiling water after all consumable parts
are removed. While boiling, the fat rises to the top, and all that is left is protein. The
changes in the rendering process included using less harsh chemical solvents and adding
the use of steam heat. Id.
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bled the disease agents in the animal protein to survive throughout
processing.8 5 The disease soon became an epidemic since leftover pro-
tein from slaughtered animals was used as animal feed.8 6 The Mad
Cow Disease epidemic in England began when infected feed was fed
to cows, and it intensified as infected cattle were slaughtered and be-
came feed for other cattle.8 7 Despite the severe public health risk, the
British government did not institute strict cannibalistic feed bans until
1996,88 allowing the problem to cross borders via international cattle
markets.
Like cows, humans are susceptible to the brain wasting disease
simply by eating infected material.89 Considering that one hamburger
may contain meat from hundreds of cows,.the risk of infection is quite
high-even if only one cow in an entire herd or batch has BSE.90 The
human strain of TSE is a new form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
("CJD"), which traditionally affected only older people. The new
form, known as variant CJD, has a characteristic clinical and patholog-
ical phenotype which differs from other routinely diagnosed cases of
CJD.91 The first cases of this human brain-wasting disease were discov-
ered in England in 1996.92 The variant CJD incubates "before erupt-
85. See Australian Acad. of Sci., supra note 76.
86. See Aberbach-Marolda, supra note 77, at 7. The animal feed was sold to farmers,
laboratories, and zoos. See id.
87. See Prusiner, supra note 79, at 88.
88. See id.
89. See NCL BULLETIN, supra note 83, at 11.
90. Pub. Broad. Sys., Frontline, Modern Meat: Interview of Dr. Robert Tauxe, Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, Chief, Food-Borne & Diarrheal Diseases Branch, http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/interviews/tauxe.html (last visited Feb.
5, 2006) [hereinafter Tauxe Interview] ("I suspect there are hundreds or even thousands
of animals that have contributed to a single hamburger."). See also Ctrs. for Disease Control
& Prevention, Div. of Bacterial Mycotic Diseases, Food-borne Illnesses General Information
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/food-borne
infections-g.htm#riskiestfoods (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
91. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, variant
CJD, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/vcjd/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). The differences
between CJD and variant CJD are "characterized by a younger age at onset of symp-
toms ... behavioral change symptoms, longer duration of illness, a non-diagnostic or nor-
mal EEG tracing, and . . . different lesions in brain tissues." U.S. Army Ctr. for Health
Promotion & Preventive Med., Questions and Answers for Medical Care Providers About
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/madcowdisease/
ProviderQA.doc. (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
92. See Merritt McKinney, Mad Cow Proteins Form in Muscle as Well as Brain, RENSE.COM,
Mar. 19, 2002; Prusiner, supra note 79, at 88. As of March 2006, there has been one docu-
mented American case of variant CDJ. See Marc Santora, Crop of Deaths from Fare Brain Dis-
ease Has Upstate Residents Asking 'Why Us',' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at B1, B4. However,
doctors claimed that the young victim contracted the disease in the United Kingdom,
where she lived until she was thirteen years old. See Family of Only U.S. Mad Cow Case Blames
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ing into dementia, paralysis and death."93 Given that prions, and thus,
BSE, are undetectable to the naked eye, and the fatal nature of variant
CJD, the USDA's current protocols are unprepared to deal with this
contemporary threat.
The American BSE aftermath left many consumer groups and
meat industry critics wondering just how concerned the USDA is with
protecting the American meat supply.9 4 For example, many critics
wondered how the suspected Holstein was allowed into the food sup-
ply in the first place. 95 Unfortunately, the multi-jurisdictional regula-
tion system prevented one enforcement branch from detaining the
cow while another awaited test results.96 "[T] esting for mad-cow dis-
ease falls under the USDA's . .. [APHIS], not ... [Food Inspection
Service]-and APHIS's job is to keep animals healthy,"97-not
humans. APHIS's "authority does not cross into the arena of food
safety."98 The USDA's response to the 2003 BSE case highlights the
problems with its bureaucratic landscape.
The easiest way to ensure the meat supply is safe is through exten-
sive testing.99 The USDA, however, continues to use "immunohis-
tochemistry" testing'00 ("IHC"), which, according to Dr. Prusiner, is
UK, CNN.COM, Oct. 25, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/conditions/10/
17/madcow.us/. The twenty-three year-old woman suffered "uncontrollable biting and hit-
ting episodes" and later could "no longer speak or control her functions." Id.
93. Adler, supra note 54, at 45-46.
94. Prior to the 2003 case of Mad Cow Disease in the United States, the USDA initi-
ated measures to prevent Mad Cow Disease from entering and spreading in America. Mem-
orandum from Cal. Cattlemen's Assoc., to SenatorJackie Speier, Cal. State Senator 1 (Mar.
8, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review). For example, in 1989, the United States "banned
the importation of ruminant animals and at-risk ruminant products from countries with
confirmed cases of BSE." Id. On December 30, 2003, the agency announced new protocol
to protect against Mad Cow Disease "including the elimination of 'downer cattle' (cows
that cannot walk [due to sickness or injury]) from the food chain, the removal of high-risk
material like spinal cords from meat processing." Schlosser, supra note 1, at Al 7. Ruminant
animals are animals that have been fed the parts of other animals, typically blood, bone,
and neurological matter. In 1997, the FDA banned the use of ruminant meat and bone
meal in cattle feed in the United States. See Prusiner, supra note 79.
95. See Adler, supra note 54, at 43, 48; see also Schlosser, Fish, supra note 73, at 253.
96. Adler, supra note 54, at 43, 48.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Prusiner, supra note 79, at 89.
100. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Servs., APHIS Hot Is-
sues, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Q & A's for Rapid BSE Test, http://www.
aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/bse-rapidtest-faq.html; see also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Re-
search in Italy Turns Up a New Form of Mad Cow Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2004, at A9
[hereinafter Research in Italy]. Although considered the "gold standard" of BSE tests, IHC is
a time-consuming process. See Prusiner, supra note 79, at 90. "[Technicians must examine
each slide [of sample brain tissue so] the process.., often [takes] as many as seven days
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"an old technique that is cumbersome and extremely time-consum-
ing..., and so is impractical for universal application.' 01 In the mid-
1980s, Dr. Prusiner and his colleagues developed a new method of
testing for low levels of prions called "conformation-dependent immu-
noassay" ("CDI"), which is fast and easy to apply universally. 10 2 In
2003, CDI gained approval for use in Europe and Japan. 103
The choice of test to be used is significant because of the time
sensitivity surrounding the detection of BSE. For example, one plausi-
ble reason why it took so long for the USDA to respond to the 2003
American BSE case is that the USDA uses a test that takes "as many as
seven days [to complete]."104 Further, since only the USDA may con-
duct the testing, samples must be sent to one of the seven USDA labo-
ratories105 before results are conclusive. Although the IHC test cannot
be blamed for all of the USDA's shortcomings, had the USDA used
the CDI test, things may have been different. In contrast to the IHC
test, the CDI test produces results in about five hours, which permits
the tests to be administered at the time of slaughter.10 6
Shortly after the discovery of the first American BSE case, Con-
sumers Union, along with other food safety and consumer groups,
met with then-Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman to discuss addi-
tional protocols to ensure the safety of the American meat supply. 10 7
Among the coalition's recommendations were an extensive testing
program and cattle identification system.108 As a result, the USDA an-
nounced that it would increase testing "for a one-and-a-half year pe-
[to complete], and is not useful for mass screenings." Id. For a more detailed description
of the IHC test, see generally U.S. Dep't of Agric., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Servs.,
APHIS Factsheet, The IHC Test Variables, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/bse.
html.
101. Prusiner, supra note 79, at 89.
102. Id. at 89-90; see also Research in Italy, supra note 100.
103. Prusiner, supra note 79, at 92; see also Research in Italy, supra note 100, at A9; Sandra
Blakeslee, One Producer of U.S. Beef Wants to Test All Its Cattle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at
A18.
104. Prusiner, supra note 79, at 90.
105. See Some Ranchers Clash, supra note 72, at Al, All.
106. See Prusiner, supra note 79, at 90; Robert Lull & Steve Heilig, Remedy for an Insane
Policy-Test All Beef for Mad Cow, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 2004, at Bll. Other differences
include the levels of prions necessary for detection. The CDI tests can detect the presence of
BSE prions whereas the IHC test detects "full-blown neurological disease." Id.; see also
Prusiner, supra note 79, at 89.
107. See Press Release, Consumers Union, Consumer Food Safety Groups Meet with
USDA Secretary to Outline Requests on Mad Cow Disease (Jan. 15, 2003).
108. See id.
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riod,"109 but would continue to use its testing method, rather than the
faster CDI test. The strategy behind the increased testing was not to
promote meat safety assurances, but rather to assess the risk of BSE in
America. By increasing testing for one and a half years, the USDA
hoped to glean a "snapshot" of the state of the American BSE
threat. 110 The USDA plan included increased testing-from 40,000
animals to between 201,000 and 268,000 animals.11' Nevertheless, this
plan still left America testing less than one percent of the thirty-five
million cattle slaughtered in America each year.1 12 Further, in light of
its limited testing and the recent discovery of another American BSE
case in June 2005,113 the "snapshot" program did not adequately por-
tray the BSE threat in America.
Compared to many other countries, not only is America's testing
method far behind the norm, but with a testing goal of only one per-
cent, it targets the least amount of animals of the countries that per-
form testing. 114 For example, "many European Union countries test
seventy-five percent of the cows old enough to be at-risk, and Japan
tests all slaughtered cows regardless of age." 115 Indeed, an interna-
tional panel consulting the USDA during the BSE aftermath sug-
gested more pervasive testing. 116
HI. USDA Protocols Create Market Inefficiencies
The USDA has vast authority, but it refuses to initiate protocols
sufficient to detect BSE, leaving the meat market paralyzed and ineffi-
cient. This leaves retailers unable to mitigate against BSE by using bet-
109. See Press Release, Consumers Union, USDA Announcement of More Mad Cow
Testing Still Inadequate to Protect Public Health (Mar. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Mar. 16
Press Release].
110. See June 24 Press Release, supra note 4; U.S. Dep't of Agric., Animal & Plant
Health Inspection Servs., USDA's BSE Testing Program, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/
issues/bsetesting/plan.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter USDA Announces BSE
Test Results].
111. See USDA Announces BSE Test Results, supra note 110. Traditionally, the USDA
only tested 20,000 cattle per year for BSE. See Blakeslee, Plan, supra note 2, at A19. How-
ever, after the 2003 American BSE case was discovered, the USDA increased its testing to
40,000 per year. Id.
112. See Mar. 16 Press Release, supra note 109; see also Official Tells, supra note 1, at F2.
113. SeeJune 24 Press Release, supra note 4.
114. See Mar. 16 Press Release, supra note 109.
115. NCL BULLETIN, supra note 83, at 11.
116. The panel was instituted to make recommendations for gauging and containing
the mad cow disease problem within the United States. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Denise
Grady, Ban Urged on All Animal Proteinfor Cattle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at A20; Alicia Ault,
Federal Panel Recommends More Testing for Mad Cow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A12.
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ter consumer indicators on product labels, producers are required to
produce under low USDA quality standards without implementing
known and widely used BSE detection processes, and consumers are
left to make uninformed purchasing decisions because they lack the
necessary information about meat and meat products. This market is
inefficient because, absent the USDA obstacles, producers would be
willing to incur costs to produce a higher quality, BSE-free product' 17
and consumers would be willing to pay more for a safer, BSE-free
product. 1 8
A. The USDA Prevents Retailers from Determining Which
Suppliers Produce the Best Quality Meat and Informing
Customers of Improved Quality Standards
The meat industry has many different layers of specialization,' 1 9
and the pervasive anonymity within the system prevents retailers from
determining which producers produce the safest meat. Although this
organization may be logistically efficient, it also creates a complicated
system in terms of accountability and traceability. Producers have dif-
ferent processing plants and once at the slaughterhouse, plants use
mass production lines to produce meat, which results in meat from
many different sources being mixed. "[W] hen [cows] are transported
to slaughter, animals from many different farms may go in the same
truck or the same transport freight to the slaughterhouse." 120 After it
is processed, distributors purchase beef to sell to retailers. Distributors
generally "purchase beef from multiple sources, (and] mix it in their
inventory, and lose track of the source of the beef they send to the
stores that they supply."' 2' This problem of anonymity as to source is
exacerbated by the fact that there is no cattle-tracking system in the
United States. During its investigation of the December 2003 case, the
USDA was unable to locate two-thirds of the eighty-cattle herd that
entered the United States along with the infected Holstein. 22 The
only reason that the USDA was able to trace the infected Holstein, is
117. See infra Part IV.A.
118. See infra Part IV.B.
119. See Pub. Broad. Sys., Frontline, Modem Meat: Interview of Bill Haw, CEO, Kan.
Nat'l Farms, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/fronfline/shows/meat/interviews/haw.
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2006). Bill Haw discusses the "life of an average cow," which
describes the various participants in meat production and demonstrates the specialized
nature of the meat industry.
120. Tauxe Interview, supra note 90.
121. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 41.
122. Shakar Vedantam, U.S. Ends Investigation of Mad Cow Case; Officials Fail to Find Two-
Thirds of Animals at Risk of Infection, WASH. PoSr, Feb. 10, 2004, at Al.
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because it came from a ranch in Canada, which does have a national
tracking system.123 Given the nature of cattle raising-many cows are
bred on a single ranch, raised for a period of time on that same farm,
fed the same feed, and then sold to various buyers124-it is unlikely
that only one infected Holstein came to the United States for slaugh-
ter. This anonymity within the system often prevents retailers from
withdrawing their business from low-quality producers because they
cannot always identify which of their many suppliers are supplying
poor meat.125
In order for retailers to determine if the meat they are getting is
safe, they would need to audit each supplier's plants to determine the
quality of the beef that each is producing, and then limit their
purchases to only the safe plants. 126 Although the larger retailers
should, and often do, perform these audits, unfortunately, audits are
not an option for smaller retailers. 127 Audits are expensive, time con-
suming, and require that the retailer have a certain relationship with
the supplier in order to gain access to their plants. For example, Jack
in the Box has the status to guarantee the quality of their product and
they "work as total partners" with their suppliers) 28
Collectively, [Jack in the Box] go[es] back to people that supply
meat . . . with the people that do the processing, back to the
slaughter plants . . . [to] make sure those plants are OK. Then
[they] audit those plants together. Then [they] have agreements
about how the testing will be done and what happens in the[]
plants.129
Not every retailer benefits from such a close relationship with its sup-
pliers. Smaller chains, mom-and-pop groceries, school districts, and
local restaurants are left with no way of assuring quality to their cus-
tomers. They lack the personnel, status, and negotiating power to en-
courage suppliers and plants to work with them in audits.
123. See Odeshoo, supra note 1, at 298-99.
124. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
125. See Micheal Ollinger & Nicole Ballenger, Amber Waves: The Economics of Food, Farm-
ing, Natural Resources and Rural America: Weighing Incentives for Food Safety in Meat and Poultry,
AMBER WAVES, Apr. 2003, at 34, 36, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/
April03/Features/WeighingIncentives.htm.
126. Pub. Broad. Sys., Frontline, Modem Meat: Interview of David Theno, Vice Presi-
dent, Technical Servs., Jack in the Box, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/meat/interviews/theno.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Theno
Interview].
127. Id.
128. "While we do not own those plants, we have a very good relationship, and it is like
we are partners in that plant and that production." Id.
129. Id.
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Furthermore, under the current testing protocol, audits are use-
less in the face of BSE. Currently there are no USDA standards in
place to universally detect BSE on a continual basis, and private farm-
ers, ranchers, and plants do not have the authority or capabilities to
test for the disease on their own. 130 As such, retailers have no way of
discovering which suppliers provide the safest meat. However, even if
a retailer could find a supplier that would provide only BSE-free
meat131-the retailer would have no way of passing on the informa-
tion to its customers. Unless the suppliers want to create a brand
name to market their meat, the labels on meat only identify the store
in which it is sold.132 However, suppliers are less likely to brand their
lower cost meats because the investment necessary to create a brand
would not be worth it for such products. 13 3 Therefore, retailers are
prevented under the Federal Meat Act meat labeling restrictions and
would violate the Federal Meat Act if they were to include any identifi-
ers of quality standards "in addition to, or different than" the USDA-
mandated quality standards. 134 As a result, retailers cannot mitigate
against the effects of Mad Cow Disease using their traditional auditing
methods.
B. Producers Are Forced to Produce at the Low Quality Standards
Set by the USDA
The USDA's antiquated statutory regulations prevent any im-
provement at the state and local levels or within the private sector,
unless specifically authorized by the agency. As discussed in Part I.B,
APHIS has sole authority to grant licenses to use diagnostic tests on
animals via the Virus Act.135 Therefore, if states, meat producers, or
ranchers wanted to increase the testing of their own products and
herds, they are prevented from doing so unless they receive a federal
license. 136 When "Congress passed the [Virus Act] back in
130. See infta Part IV.A.
131. Hypothetically, if a supplier could purchase cows from American ranchers who
have never fed their herds infected animal parts, and could verify their practices to their
buyers through documentation and recordkeeping, then the suppliers would be able to
assure that the meat they were selling was BSE-free.
132. See Ollinger & Ballenger, supra note 125, at 36. Not all companies want to bear the
extra costs and risks associated with creating a brand name. Although consumers "will pay
premiums for branded products because they are perceived to be of better quality," the
suppliers must invest much more in producing the brand product. Id.
133. Id. at 37.
134. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2000).
135. See infra Part I.B.
136. See infra Part I.B.
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1913... [it] not only gave the USDA the power to ... [specify] what
safety tests [ranchers and meat packers] had to perform; it also gave
the USDA the ability to prevent testing." 137 Congress amended the
Virus Act in 1985 and effectively prevented individual states from en-
acting legislation for license-granting authority as well. Congress ex-
plained that due to drastic changes in animal agriculture since 1913,
an "intrastate/interstate" distinction no longer exists for animal prod-
ucts. 138 Congress also claimed that a uniform regulatory standard
would be better for the "truly national market."'1 9 Although several
courts addressing APHIS's regulatory preemption of state law have
found that the Virus Act does preempt state law,140 regardless of
whether preemption is indeed the case in all states, the mere threat of
preemption prevents individual states from successfully passing legisla-
tion to require testing of all cattle for BSE.' 41
C. Consumers Cannot Make Informed Purchasing Decisions
The government has assumed responsibility for meat inspection
and "[w] e take as given that government has many important roles to
play, that federal authorities are important actors in fulfilling those
roles, and that significant federal resources will, and should continue
to be devoted to these activities."'142 Although there have been signifi-
cant technological changes within the meat industry, changes in meat
regulation and inspection are rare.
There have been a number of important changes in the meat in-
dustry over the last 50 years.... As the line speeds and the general
efficiency of the slaughter plants increase, there may also be a
greater opportunity for contamination to spread from one carcass
to another.... [T]he industrialization of our meat supply opened
up a conduit for ... infections to pass through to the consumer.' 4 3
137. SeeJon Ortiz, USDA Goes Mad: Meat Plant Told It Can't Test Every Cow, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Apr. 14, 2004, at B6.
138. See S. REP. No. 99-145, at 338-39 (1985).
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Lynnbrook Farms v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1100 (C.D.
Ill. 1995); Murphy v. Smithkline Beecham Animal Health Group, 898 F. Supp. 811 (D.
Kan. 1995); Grand Labs., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 10 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 1993).
141. See Will Shuck, Bill to Test Every Cow Is Dropped: Critics Assailed Costs of Proposal,
RECORD, Apr. 29, 2004. California State Sentator "Michael Machado. . . dropped his plans
to require mad cow disease tests on every head of cattle slaughtered in California....
Currently, the federal government prohibits such testing, and it remained unclear whether
California would be able to enact a contradictory law." Id.
142. Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31
SETON HALL L. REv. 61, 65 (2000).
143. Tauxe Interview, supra note 90.
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Unfortunately, because insufficient product information is sup-
plied, the majority of consumers have no idea that the government
does not adequately protect the meat supply. Unless the supplier pro-
duces a brand name, marketing strategies do not have a consumer
focus, and consumers have much less access to information about the
meat products they buy than do those who produce them.14 4 Cur-
rently, meat that consumers purchase at the supermarket does not
indicate anything beyond the basics: weight, date, cooking instruc-
tions, and the store name. Absent from the label information are spe-
cifics such as who the meat producer is, which plant processed it,
where its farm or ranch of origin is located, what kinds of tests were
conducted, and for which health and safety risks were the tests con-
ducted. To find out any of this information while at the store, a con-
sumer could ask the butcher, but butchers are not likely to know the
answers either. 145 The butcher may be able to give the consumer a
phone number to call, but instead of specifics, the consumer is likely
to hear only the following information: "[L] ook at the freshness of the
product. Look at the shelf life."1 46 Not only does imperfect informa-
tion affect purchasing power, but it also affects the legal liability of
meat producers.
D. The Legal Liability of Meat Producers Provides Little Incentive
for Change
The idea that civil lawsuits will not only redress consumer harm
but will also force defendants within the meat industry to change their
"bad" behavior is not a reality in the meat industry.147 In theory, civil
lawsuits seem simple: If meat producer X produces and distributes
adulterated meat, it violates the Federal Meat Act and PFDA. 148 Vari-
ous consumers purchase and consume the tainted meat and as a re-
sult experience illness or even die. The victims or victims' families
bring a lawsuit and seek monetary damages from meat producer X.
Any damages awarded are transaction costs in connection with the
sale of contaminated meat, and, in theory, meat producer X would
then be compelled to minimize the incidence of adulterated products
in its plants. Unfortunately, there are many problems with this theory
under current meat production practices.
144. See Theno Interview, supra note 126.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Ollinger & Ballenger, supra note 125, at 37.
148. See supra Part I.A.1.
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First, causation is an issue. "[P]laintiffs are unlikely to receive
awards in food-borne illness trials, even in the case of a major illness,
because rarely can the plaintiff make a certain link between a particu-
lar food and the sickness." 149 Many food-borne pathogens have an in-
cubation period, making it difficult to prove causation by a sufficient
legal standard. Second, even if a plaintiff could prove all the elements
under the Federal Meat Act and PFDA, monetary damages vary greatly
and are often too small to prompt any sort of change in the meat
industry.150 Third, because producers want to avoid the threat of pub-
lic trials as much as possible, lawsuits are more likely to settle than go
to trial. Without a highly publicized trial and exposure to market reac-
tion, producers are unlikely to change their meat safety practices.
15 1
Therefore, even if consumers could overcome these hurdles by track-
ing a tainted hamburger back to the plant, the feedlot, and the ranch
to pinpoint exactly how the infected cow contracted BSE, they are left
with little remedy other than a one-time monetary compensation that
will not affect meat safety.
IV. USDA Protocols Force the Market to Remain Inefficient
In general, an inefficient market is one where the given commod-
ity's price does not reflect its fair market value. Here, an inefficient
meat market indicates that producers would be willing to invest more
money to implement better safety control mechanisms on their lines,
and thus, produce a higher quality product if they had the legal
means to do so. On the consumer side, it suggests that consumers
would be willing to pay more for a higher quality product if they were
informed of which products were safe through proper labeling and
product differentiation.
A. Producers Would Be Willing to Incur Costs to Produce Safer
Products
Following the 2003 BSE case, Creekstone Farms Premium Beef
LLC ("Creekstone"), a ranch in Arkansas City, Kansas, wanted to test
149. See Ollinger & Ballenger, supra note 125, at 37.
150. Sharlene W. Lassiter, From Hoof to Hamburger: The Fiction of a Safe Meat Supply, 33
WILLAMETrE L. REv. 411, 419-44 (1997) (discussing how the civil action through consumer
lawsuits seeking monetary damages have failed to shift the cost-benefit analysis for the meat
producer enough to alter the status quo).
151. See Ollinger & Ballenger, supra note 125, at 37.
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its meat for BSE. 152 The ranch proposed to use the CDI rapid test
developed by Dr. Prusiner. 53 Creekstone's main buyers were Japanese
companies, 15 4 but the Japanese government closed its doors to meat
exports from the United States after the USDA refused to initiate test-
ing for BSE. 15 5 The USDA denied Creekstone's request because it had
"qualms about delegating authority to test for mad cow [disease]."156
The USDA also claimed that the use of the test "as proposed by Creek-
stone would have implied a consumer safety aspect that is not scientifi-
cally warranted."' 5 7
Given the changes in meat inspection in the 1990s, the USDA
response is unjustified. The worries regarding "delegating authority"
certainly do not exist for other types of inspection within the meat
industry. As discussed in Part I.A, HACCP shifted almost all inspection
duties-including tests for food-borne pathogens like E. coli and sal-
monella-to plant employees.1 " The Food Inspection Service no
longer controls meat inspection as it did when the Federal Meat Act
was first enacted in 1906, and APHIS, likewise, should not control test-
ing the way it has been since the Virus Act was enacted in 1913.
Further, the USDA's claim that testing all its cows is "not scientifi-
cally warranted" with the rapid CDI test is unsupported. The Euro-
pean Union and Japan approved the CDI test in 2003. Moreover,
many countries within the European Union test over seventy-five per-
cent of the animals they slaughter, and Japan tests all of its cows sent
to slaughter with the rapid CDI test.1 59 In fact, shortly after denying
Creekstone use of the rapid CDI test, the USDA approved CDI for use
in its main laboratories during its increased testing period. 160 In addi-
tion, Dr. Prusiner also believes that "[g]iven that seemingly healthy
152. See Jon Ortiz, State Looks to Test Beef. Lawmakers Hope to Soften Foreign Ban, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, Mar. 12, 2004, at DI, D2 [hereinafter Ortiz, Soften Foreign Ban].
153. See supra Part II.
154. Japan alone accounts for roughly ten percent of United States foreign beef sales.
See Ortiz, Soften Foreign Ban, supra note 152, at D1.
155. Since December 23, 2003, more than fifty countries accounting for roughly $3.86
billion in export sales have closed its doors to United States beef. See id.
156. See id. at DI, D2; see also Press Release, Bill Hawks, U.S. Dep't ofAgric., Undersec'y
for Mktg. & Regulatory Programs, Statement Regarding a Request by Creekstone Farms for
Private BSE Testing (Apr. 9, 2004).
157. Press Release, Bill Hawks, supra note 156.
158. See supra Part I.A.2.
159. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
160. See Ira Dreyfuss, U.S. Reportedly Approves Mad Cow Test, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 18,
2004; see also John S. Carroll (ed.), Let Beef Consumers Decide, L.A. TIMES, May, 5, 2004, at
B12.
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animals can potentially carry pathogenic prions .... testing all slaugh-
tered animals is the only rational policy."161
B. Consumers Are Willing to Pay More for BSE-Free Meat
Currently, meat in the United States is one of the most inexpen-
sive food products available. In fact, beef now costs roughly half of
what it did in 1970.162 The price of beef, however, does not reflect
what consumers would be willing to pay for a higher quality product.
Consumer Reports conducted a national survey in January 2004-
weeks after the discovery of the first case of Mad Cow Disease in the
United States. Respondents were first screened for awareness of the
discovery of Mad Cow Disease in the United States and beef consump-
tion. 163 The survey indicated that 71% of adults who eat beef would be
willing to pay more to support testing of cattle to ensure that they are
free of BSE. 164 Of these, 95% would be willing to pay ten cents more
per pound of beef, the upper limit of the estimated cost of testing.165
Additionally, if certified and non-certified varieties were available at
the store, 77% of those who eat beef would pay more for beef certified
as testing negative for BSE.166 This survey indicates that consumers
want the chance to make informed decisions. Nevertheless, since the
industry is unable to test for BSE themselves and is forced by the
USDA to label their meat with minimal information, consumers can-
not differentiate products based on quality standards, and as a result,
they are not given the opportunity to demonstrate their preferences.
V. Solution: Mandatory Recall Authority Is Necessary for
Consumer Safety
Given that BSE is difficult to detect and the high consumer
health risks it poses, the meat industry and the agencies that regulate
it do not adequately provide consumers assurance that the products
they buy are safe. To properly protect American consumers, the
USDA, its regulations, and the laws under which it operates should be
161. Prusiner, supra note 79, at 86, 92.
162. Pub. Broad. Sys., Frontline, Modem Meat: Industrial Meat: Interview of Patrick
Boyle, CEO, Am. Meat Inst., http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/in-
dustrial/consolidation.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
163. CONSUMER REPORTS: MAD Cow DISEASE SURVEY 1, 2 (2004) (prepared by Con-
sumer Reports Market Research).
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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completely overhauled and should incorporate a more comprehen-
sive prevention system. 167 However, such a long term solution is highly
unlikely to be implemented anytime soon. Further, the lengthy legisla-
tive process that would ensue would offer no protection to Americans
during the interim. 168
Considering that the USDA fails to have adequate preventative
mechanisms to detect BSE and that it prevents the market from ensur-
ing that only safe products enter the stream of commerce, the meat
regulatory system also needs authoritative containment mechanisms,
in the likely event that there are future cases of BSE in America.169
Therefore, the next best solution is to delegate mandatory recall au-
thority to the USDA, so that, in the case of a BSE outbreak, the USDA
is better equipped to correct the situation and alert consumers of the
potential danger.
A. Current USDA Recall Authority Lacks a Safety Net
Between 1995 and 2000, the USDA initiated 275 recalls for meat
products, for a total of more than 140 million pounds of meat.170 Of
all the recalls completed, less than thirty percent of the contaminated
meat was recovered. 1 7 1
The reason meat is rarely recovered is that the current USDA re-
call process is extremely lengthy, and, given the perishable nature of
meat, it fails to recognize that time is of the essence when issuing a
recall of tainted product. The voluntary and secret nature of USDA
recall authority prolongs and complicates recall completion.
167. For example, the USDA should increase testing for BSE and test all cows meant
for human consumption. The Agency should also initiate a cattle identification and track-
ing system in order to reduce the amount of time it takes to trace back infected cows to
their herd of origin. Additionally, centralizing meat regulation into one agency and de-
marking specific roles within its branches would alleviate overlapping jurisdictional
problems.
168. The problems confronting an overhaul of meat industry regulation is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a more detailed discussion regarding such obstacles, see Casey,
supra note 25, at 147.
169. In fact, the most recent case of American BSE was discovered in March 2006. See
Miranda Hitti, Alabama Cow Has Mad Cow Disease: Cow Never Entered the Animal or Human
Food Chains, U.S. Official Says, WEBMD.coM, Mar. 13, 2006, http://www.webmd.com/con-
tent/article/119/113557.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
170. Pub. Broad. Sys., Frontline, Meat Recalls, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/meat/safe/recalls.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006.
171. Id.
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First, unlike the toy and car tire industries where issued recalls
are mandatory, 172 establishments distributing meat notify the public
on a voluntary basis. A recall, as Food Inspection Service defines it, is a
"firm's voluntary removal of products from trade or consumer chan-
nels . . . to protect the public from consuming adulterated or mis-
branded products."1 73 Under such a voluntary system, the USDA does
not have the authority to "require a company to follow certain recall
procedures." 174 Without a strict procedure, firms then have the ability
to negotiate the scope of the recall, and "while they're negotiating
how much meat should be recalled, people are eating the meat.' 75
Additionally, once a voluntary recall is initiated, the USDA has a
very limited role. Using press releases and web postings, the USDA
alerts consumers to the recall.' 76 Many critics think such passive notifi-
cation is ineffective' 77 and the USDA should participate more. How-
ever, once it has issued the alerts, the Agency merely monitors the
recall progress and has little more responsibility.' 78 Thus, the USDA
has no real knowledge of whether companies promptly and properly
complete the recalls.
Further, under the voluntary system, companies are not required
to notify the Agency when they identify a potentially unsafe prod-
uct.179 As such, there is no way of knowing if tainted meat has entered
the stream of commerce until it is too late-and even then, tracing it
back to the processing plant is not always certain. If, for some lucky
reason, there is a "cluster of illnesses in one town, and epidemiologists
[can] trace it back to meat at a restaurant [and] ... there [i]s a sam-
ple of the meat left over in the restaurant, maybe they can find out
what plant it came from, and that can precipitate a big recall." 180 Un-
172. See GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 3. For example, the agencies responsible for
the safety of products can order the recall of toys, heart pacemakers, and automobiles. See
id.; Schlosser, Fish, supra note 73, at 245.
173. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Food Safety & Inspection Serv., FSIS Update of
Recall Activities (Feb. 9, 2004), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/recalls/prelease/
update067-2003.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (emphasis added).
174. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 54.
175. Pub. Broad. Sys., Frontline, Modem Meat: Interview of Eric Schlosser, Investiga-
tive Journalist, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/interviews/
schlosser.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Schlosser Interview].
176. See GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 11 ("To carry out the[ ] verification checks, [the] USDA... contact[s] a
percentage of the company's customers to determine whether the recall was carried out.").
179. See GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 54.
180. Schlosser Interview, supra note 175.
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fortunately, absent such luck, American consumers would have no
idea if restaurants and supermarkets are selling tainted meat.
Second, once firms have agreed to conduct a voluntary recall, the
USDA complicates the process by requiring state departments of agri-
culture to sign a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"), a con-
tract binding the state health officials not to disclose where shipments
of tainted meat have been shipped within its state, in exchange for
finding out from the USDA where the meat was shipped. 18 1 Only if
the MOUs are signed will the USDA disclose to state health officials
where the tainted products were shipped. 182 The officials may then
approach grocery stores, restaurants and businesses to ask if they will
notify their customers. 183 If the businesses refuse, consumers may be
left completely in the dark had they not thought to consult USDA web
alerts on the off chance that a meat recall was issued in their area. 84
Even if the businesses do agree to post notices, the time state health
officials waste trying to convince owners to notify their customers in-
creases the likelihood that consumers eat the tainted meat. Not only is
this contrary to public policy, but the process is very time consuming,
as demonstrated in the Washington state BSE case. After the tests
came back positive, it took an entire week to notify the affected states
of the risk involved.185
The USDA claims the particulars about beef recalls, such as "dis-
tribution lists obtained from a firm recalling a meat ... product are
considered proprietary information protected from public disclo-
sure.'' 86 As such, "the names and addresses of affected businesses,
[are] proprietary and confidential information,"1 8 7 and are generally
exempt from the Freedom of Information Act.' 8 8 Such a policy indi-
181. See Memorandum of Understanding Between FSIS and the Cal. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs. (on file with U.S.F. Law Review) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understand-
ing]; see also Proposed Bill Bucks USDA Recall Policy Around the State, CoNrRA COSTA TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2004, at F4 [hereinafter Proposed Bill].
182. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 181, at 2; see also Proposed Bil4
supra note 181, at F4.
183. See Marjie Lundstrom, State's Meat Recall Secrecy Pact Leaves Consumers in the Dark,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 22, 2004, at A3 [hereinafter State's Meat Recall].
184. See id.
185. See State Hit a Wall, supra note 14, at D1.
186. GAO REPORT, supra note, 13, at 25 n.23; see Memorandum of Understanding,
supra note 181, at 2.
187. Jon Ortiz, Mad Cow Secrecy May End: A Bill Requiring Better Public Notification Goes to
Schwarzenegger's Desk, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 27, 2004, at D1. See also State's Meat Recal supra
note 183, at A3.
188. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 181, at 2; see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (4) (2000).
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cates that the USDA's primary objective is protecting the industry bot-
tom line as opposed to consumer protection. 8 9
B. Mad Cow Disease Is a Unique Threat and Mandatory Recall
Authority Is Necessary to Protect American Consumers
The public health risks associated with BSE require containment
measures that are swift and effective. Currently, under the voluntary
recall process, timeframes of recovery exceed the actual shelf life of
the product,190 which renders the voluntary recall procedure almost
useless. As such, concerns for public health and safety demand further
regulation to give mandatory recall authority to the USDA. Although
Food Inspection Service already has several methods for ensuring
compliance, 191 the authority to mandate recalls is necessary given the
swift nature of contemporary health threats and American commerce.
Mandatory recall authority would include the power to "(1) require a
company to notify the agency when it has distributed a potentially un-
safe product, (2) order a recall, (3) establish recall requirements, and
(4) impose monetary penalties if a company violates recall require-
ments."'192 As such, mandatory recall authority would reduce delays
incident to the a company's ability to negotiate or respond to the re-
call as well as eliminate the so-called need for secret MOU
agreements.
By allowing the USDA to order a recall the USDA would have
more control over a potentially catastrophic situation. As it is now, the
Agency is a mere by-stander. By requiring companies to notify the
189. California proposed a bill to address the recall problem, S.B. 1585, which was
vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. The bill, if passed "would have ended a se-
crecy agreement between the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and California that
prevents the state from disclosing the names and locations of stores that receive shipments
of recalled meat." Press Release, Ctr. for Science in the Pub. Interest, Schwarzenegger
Vetoes Meat Recall Disclosure Bill, available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/200410011.
html.
190. See GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
191. One of Food Inspection Service's enforcement mechanisms is the removal of the
quality control program and recapture of quality inspection. This sanction is considered a
harsh punishment for those plants who continually fail quality standards because it may
have the effect of putting a producer out of business. Quality control programs are re-
quired for production of certain products, including, but not limited to, child nutrition
labeled products, nutrition labeled products, and products whose labels bear a fat or lean
claim. In these cases, the establishments cannot produce the products under traditional
inspection methods which can ultimately drive producers out of business. Although this
procedure is seen as a punishment, it also has the effect of preventing producers from
increasing and improving their safety programs on their own. Food Safety, supra note 15, at
692 n.87.
192. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
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USDA when it has distributed potentially tainted meat and establish-
ing recall requirements, the USDA would be an active participant in
recovering the adulterated meat. Further, the public would no longer
be at the mercy of businesses to find out if they have purchased in-
fected products since the USDA would have control over public notifi-
cation. Accurate and early notification is the key to effective recalls,
and delays, such as the one documented in December 2003 after the
first case of American BSE was detected, are unacceptable given the
severity of the BSE threat.1 93 Americans who consume tainted prod-
ucts are at risk of infection-and the disease associated with the infec-
tion is always fatal. 194 "The more time that passes, the greater the
likelihood that a large portion of the contaminated product will not
be recovered, thereby exposing a larger number of people to serious
health risks." 195
Conclusion
The current USDA regulations do not protect American consum-
ers from the threat of BSE contamination. In fact, its antiquated laws
and overreaching protocols create market inefficiencies and prevent
the market from self-correcting its many problems. Even though meat
producers and consumers would be willing to incur costs to produce
and purchase higher quality and BSE-free meat, the USDA inhibits
the natural market. Given that the USDA has shifted inspection duties
to the industry itself, its justifications for prohibiting higher quality
production are inapposite. Although meat inspection authority
should be completely overhauled, it is unlikely to happen. The next
best solution is to mandate mandatory recall authority to the USDA in
order to assure that the USDA has some containment mechanisms in
place, if, and more precisely, when another BSE case is found in
America. The nature of commerce and the BSE threat demand swift
response mechanisms, and currently, voluntary recalls are not only in-
effective but lengthy as well. Further, since the USDA has taken a "see
no evil" approach 196 in terms of detecting Mad Cow Disease,
193. See supra Part II.
194. See supra Part II.
195. Food Safety, supra note 15, at 695; THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, SAFETY AT LAST:
THE POLITICS OF E. COLI AND OTHER Foo-BoRNE KILLERS 91 (1998) (providing table of
top meat recalls by weight, including total pounds recalled and total pounds actually
recovered).
196. Other countries similarly denied "there was any risk of mad cow disease among
their own cattle. [However, those] denials proved false, once widespread testing for the
disease was introduced." Schlosser, supra note 1, at A17.
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mandatory recall authority is necessary to enable the USDA to protect
public health at the final stages of commerce.
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